Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts by Carrington, Paul D. & Martin, James A.
Michigan Law Review 
Volume 66 Issue 2 
1967 
Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts 
Paul D. Carrington 
University of Michigan Law School 
James A. Martin 
University of Michigan Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr 
 Part of the Courts Commons, Jurisdiction Commons, and the State and Local Government Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Paul D. Carrington & James A. Martin, Substantive Interests and the Jurisdiction of State Courts, 66 MICH. 
L. REV. 227 (1967). 
Available at: https://repository.law.umich.edu/mlr/vol66/iss2/2 
 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Michigan Law Review at University of Michigan Law 
School Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Michigan Law Review by an authorized editor 
of University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact 
mlaw.repository@umich.edu. 
SUBSTANTIVE INTERESTS AND THE 
JURISDICTION OF STATE COURTS 
Paul D. Carrington* and James A. Martin** 
P ENNOYER1 indeed is dead.2 The primitive ritual of service of process could not survive as a general solution to the problem of 
state power over individuals. Committed as we are to the idea that the 
judicial power should be exercised in a manner that is responsive to 
the common welfare, we could not suffer the limits of power to be 
determined irrationally by the random success of process servers. 
Offering only the virtues of simplicity and economy, the ritualistic 
method had to yield in order to make the judicial power a sharper 
and more effective tool with which to pursue our common goals. 
Although it is therefore desirable to put the ghost to rest, a word of 
caution seems to be timely. 
I. SUBSTANTIVE POLICY AND THE DEMISE OF PENNOYER V. NEFF 
The vice of the nineteenth century method of limiting the power 
of state courts is familiar, but a simple illustration may be helpful. 
In the lore of conflict of laws, there is a shopworn hypothetical of an 
evil defendant who fires a gun across a state line at the plaintiff.3 
The purpose of the hypothetical is to demonstrate the wisdom of the 
classical choice of law analysis, which would apply the law of the 
place where the plaintiff was wounded because the wound was the 
last act necessary to liability. This is an appealing choice because we 
would not like the defendant to be sheltered by a savage, exculpating 
rule of the place in which he pulled the trigger.4 The same reasons 
which make it appealing to apply the protective law of the plaintiff's 
• Professor of Law, University of Michigan. B.A. 1952, University of Texas; LL.B. 
1955, Harvard University.-Ed. 
•• Second-year student at the University of Michigan Law School. B.S. 1965, Uni-
versity of Illinois; M.S. 1966, University of Michigan. 
I. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877). 
2. Cf. Ehrenzweig, Pennoyer Is Dead-Long Live Pennoyer, 30 ROCKY MT. L. REv. 
285 (1958). 
3. REsTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 377, Illustration 1 (1934). 
4. The argument encounters some embarrassment when a rule more favorable to 
the plaintiff prevails in the place from which the defendant shot. Under such a circum-
stance, the proper choice of law is less clear. Cf. Schmidt v. Driscoll Hotel, Inc., 249 
Minn. 376, 82 N.W.2d 365 (1957) (dram shop act case; plaintiff, injured in state A by 
act of intoxicated driver who became intoxicated in state B may sue under dran1 shop 
act of state B). Contra, Eldridge v. Don Beachcomber, Inc., 342 Ill. App. 151, 95 N.E.2d 
512 (1950). 
[227] 
228 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:227 
state, in accordance with the old Restatement rule,5 also make it 
reasonable to select the courts of that state as a proper forum in 
which to resolve the issues of liability. The plaintiff's state has a 
legitimate and important interest in protecting persons within its 
borders from such events and in assuring adequate compensation to 
victims. Furthermore, the defendant has consciously offended the 
law and the tranquillity of the plaintiff's state. While he has not 
actually consented to adjudication of his liability there, such consent 
can be fabricated by reliance on the same sort of moral claim that 
frequently gives rise to fictional contracts.6 The civil law of battery 
is sufficiently important to the common welfare that its application 
should not be frustrated by the skill of the defendant in evading the 
process server. 
Compelling as this conclusion may be, it would have been du-
bious at the beginning of the century. Conventional analysis would 
have limited the power of the state to the reach of its process servers.7 
The ritual could not be performed in the absence of the defendant,8 
and it would deprive him of due process of law to proceed without 
such a demonstration of power. While the result was unsatisfactory in 
its application to the hypothetical, such frustrations were borne. 
Partly, this was because they were infrequent.11 As interstate activity 
increased to a level that made such irritations noticeable, exceptions 
to the requirement of the ritual increased. 
Perhaps the first challenge came with the emergence of the cor-
porate form, which was not easily assimilated to the needs of a 
physical ritual. Accommodations were made which tended generally 
to favor the exercise of power to protect local citizens from the trans-
gressions of foreign corporations.10 It was, however, the development 
of the public interest in compensation of automobile accident victims 
which brought the simple ritualism to bay.11 In the early years of 
5. R.EsTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAws §§ 377-90 (1934). 
6. See J. DAWSON, UNJUST ENRICHMENT 10-26 (1951). 
7. Dull v. Blackman, 169 U.S. 243, 247 (1898). 
8. There are some minor exceptions to this, most notably if the absent defendant 
was domiciled in the forum [Hurlbut v. Thomas, 55 Conn. 181, IO A. 556 (1887); 
Huntley v. Baker, 40 N.Y. Sup. Ct. (33 Hun.) 578 (1884)], or if the case in which 
jurisdiction was contested was some form of continuation of another proceeding in 
which the forum had jurisdiction [Nations v. Johnson, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 195 (1860); 
Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, 228 U.S. 346 (1913)]. 
9. In 1951, Professor Ehrenzweig reported that the case of a person firing across 
a state border had never arisen in an American court. Ehrenzweig, The Place of Acting 
in Intentional Multistate Torts: Law and Reason Versus the Restatement, 36 MINN. 
L. REv. 1, 31 (1951). 
10. The leading case is Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 59 U.S. (18 How.) 404 (1855). 
11. Cf. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953) ("The [iurisdic-
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interstate automobile litigation, an effort was made to base jurisdic-
tion on the consent of the non-resident motorist.12 But soon it was 
recognized that the consent was fictional13 and that jurisdiction rested 
on the moral claims of the state to the power to protect the common 
welfare of its people.14 
Similar substantive policies produced similar results when the 
interstate sale of investment securities15 and life insurance policies16 
created special needs which could be met only by the assertion of 
power over persons beyond the reach of conventional service of 
process. There followed a flood of cases in which suppliers of goods 
were subjected to the power of the states in which defects in their 
merchandise took harmful effect.17 By stages, these substantive excep-
tions have consumed the better part of the old rule,18 so that it now 
tional] liability rests on the inroad which the automobile has made on the decision 
of Pennoyer v. Neff.'). 
12. The leading case to enunciate this principle was Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 
(1927). 
13. Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresident Motorists, 39 HARv. L. REv. 563 (1926) 
[commenting on the state court decision, Pawloski v. Hess, 253 Mass. 478, 149 N.E. 112 
(1925)]. 
14. Cf. Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R.R., 346 U.S. 338, 341 (1953) ("The potentialities 
of damage by a motorist, in a population as mobile as ours, are such that those whom 
he injures must have opportunities of redress against him ••.. "); see Currie, The 
Growth of the Long-Arm: Eight Years of Extended Jurisdiction in Illinois, 1963 ILL. 
L.F. 533, 540. 
15. Henry L. Doherty &: Co. v. Goodman, 294 U.S. 623 (1935). 
16. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957). See also Travelers 
Health Ass'n v. Virginia, 339 U.S. 643, 649 (1950) (dictum). 
17. Among the leading cases are Gray v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary 
Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961); Smyth v. Twin State Improvement Corp., 
ll6 Vt. 569, 80 A.2d 664, 25 A.L.R.2d 1193 (1951). Contra, Erlanger Mills, Inc. v. Cohoes 
Fibre Mills, Inc., 239 F.2d 502 (4th Cir. 1956); Johns v. Bay State Abrasive Prods. Co., 
89 F. Supp. 654 (D. Md. 1950). 
IS. Cf. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175, 180-81 (2d Cir. 1967) ("The 
past fifty years have seen such a widespread adoption of statutes asserting personal 
jurisdiction over nonresidents and so many decisions upholding their constitutionality 
as to constitute a veritable bouleversement of the magisterial pronouncement in Pen-
noyer v. Neff."); A. EHRENZWEIG, CONFLICT OF LAws 78 (1962) ("In this country, too, 
fairness to the parties has increasingly become the determining factor in the develop-
ment of the law of jurisdiction.'?; REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 74(1) 
(Tent. Draft No. 3, 1956) ("A state has judicial jurisdiction over a person if the per-
son's relationship to the state is such as to make the exercise of judicial jurisdiction 
reasonable.'?; Ehrenzweig, supra note 2, at 292 (1958) ("[N]on-resident, absent individ-
uals not transacting business in the state will have to remain exempt from jurisdiction 
with specific exceptions to be established from case to case. Pennoyer will continue to 
haunt McGee.'?; von Mehren & Trautman, Jurisdiction To Adjudicate: A Suggested 
Analysis, 79 HARv. L. REv. 1121, 1128 (1966) (noting the "movement away from the bias 
favoring the defendant toward permitting the plaintiff to insist that the defendant 
come to him'). But cf. Hazard, A General Theory of State-Court Jurisdiction, 1965 
S. CT. REv. 241 ("Its rules of jurisdiction have been gradually abandoned in detail 
• • • • But the conceptual structure established by Pennoyer remains substantially 
intact.'). 
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seems more accurate to describe the present rule as one favoring the 
constitutionality of the exercise of state judicial power so long as 
"minimum contacts"111 with the defendant or the case can be 
demonstrated. Today, there seems to be no doubt that the state of 
injury could assert its power over the foreign gunman to the extent 
necessary to fix his civil liability. 20 
II. SUBSTANTIVE POLICY AND "MINIMUM CONTACTS": 
A VARIABLE TEST 
The Supreme Court has provided the slogan of "fair play for the 
defendant" to help work out the limits of state power in cases less 
easily resolved than that of the interstate gunman.21 This slogan 
is said to mean that the state may exercise judicial power only over 
defendants with whom it has at least "minimum contacts.''22 It is the 
thesis of this article that the requisite minimum quantum of "con-
tact" between the defendant and the forum does and should vary 
with the measure of the values affected and the costs inflicted by the 
attempted exercise of power. In other words, the test, however 
phrased, must be adapted to the needs of each of the environments 
in which it must operate. In light of the history of state judicial 
power just described, with its marked emphasis on special exceptions 
for special substantive needs, and in light of all that has been said 
about the need for balanced judgment in the application of the due 
process requirement to a variety of problems, 23 it is perhaps sur-
prising to find a need to make this observation. But courts engaged 
in the daily occupation of deciding cases one at a time, when con-
19. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
20. Roy v. North Am. Newspaper Alliance, 106 N.H. 92, 97, 205 A.2d 844, 847 
(1964) ("If a defendant ••. negligently shoots a bullet from state X into state Y . . • 
we do not seriously question the right of the injured person to seek redress in state 
Y and exercise judicial jurisdiction over the defendant in state Y.'); REsTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 84, Illustration 3 (Tent. Draft No. 3 1956): 
A is engaged in blasting operations in a part of state X which is close to the border 
of state Y. A stone, hurled into the air by an explosion, falls upon B's house in Y. 
If a Y statute so provides at the time of this occurrence, Y can exercise judicial 
jurisdiction over A and entertain in its courts B's action against him. 
21. Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940) (quoted in International Shoe Co. v. 
Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316). 
22. For a fuller elaboration of the "minimum contacts" rule in practice, see gen-
erally Currie, supra note 14, Hazard, supra note 18, and von Mehren 8: Trautman, 
supra note 18. 
23. Karst, The First Amendment and Harry Kalven: An Appreciative Comment on 
the Advantages of Thinking Small, 13 U.C.L.A.L. REv. l (1965), discusses balancing, 
the constitutional protection of free speech, and reviews some of the recent literature. 
In advocating a clearer understanding of the technique, he feels moved to apologize 
that we have undoubtedly learned more about balancing than we wanted to know. 
Id. at 22, n.92. 
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fronted with factual settings that vary as greatly as the differing legal 
principles they are asked to enforce, seldom find occasion to make 
the kind of comparisons which would reveal the plasticity of the 
constitutional test being applied. As a consequence, there is a danger 
that the "minimum contacts" formulation may take on a rigid 
aspect that will induce some courts to disguise or secrete some of 
the factors influencing their decisions, and may induce others to 
make decisions as unreasonably burdensome to defendants as the 
old Pennoyer principle was to plaintiffs. 
A. The Hierarchy of Interests 
It is perhaps unnecessary to assert that there is a discernible hier-
archy among the many interests and values which may be asserted in 
favor of a decision to exercise, or to refrain from exercising, the 
judicial power. It would require an author of more than ordinary 
pride of opinion to undertake a complete description of that hier-
archy, and the complete picture is not necessary to an understanding 
that some rights are more important than others. A few examples 
may nevertheless be helpful. Thus, some years ago, Lon Fuller and 
William Perdue undertook to describe one aspect of the structure in 
Aristotelian terms: 
It is obvious that the three "interests" we have distinguished do 
not present equal claims to judicial intervention. It may be assumed 
that ordinary standards of justice would regard the need for judicial 
intervention as decreasing in the order in which we have listed the 
three interests. The "restitution interest," involving a combination 
of unjust impoverishment with unjust gain, presents the strongest 
case for relief. If, following Aristotle, we regard the purpose of justice 
as the maintenance of an equilibrium of goods among the members 
of society, the restitution interest presents twice as strong a claim 
to judicial intervention as the reliance interest, since if A not only 
causes B to lose one unit but appropriates that unit to himself, the 
resulting discrepancy between A and B is not one unit but two. 
On the other hand, the promisee who has actually relied on the 
promise, even though he may not thereby have enriched the prom-
isor, certainly presents a more pressing case for relief than the 
promisee who merely demands satisfaction for his disappointment in 
not getting what was promised him. In passing from compensation 
for change of position to compensation for loss of expectancy we 
pass, to use Aristotle's terms again, from the realm of corrective 
justice to that of distributive justice. The law no longer seeks merely 
to heal a disturbed status quo, but to bring into being a new situa-
tion. It ceases to act defensively or restoratively, and assumes a more 
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active role. With the transition, the justification for legal relief loses 
its self-evident quality.24 
If this is sound analysis, and accurately reflects the values which 
our judges bring to their work, we must expect that somewhat less 
contact with the forum state will generally be necessary to trigger 
a response favorable to the exercise of power in a restitution case 
than in a reliance case, while less will generally be required in a 
reliance case than in an expectation case. At least, this will be so to 
the extent that we are able to identify these substantive differences 
at the preliminary stages of litigation. 
Similarly, we might suggest that, within the sphere of compensa-
tory tort litigation, plaintiffs who appear to have suffered bodily 
injury are generally somewhat more likely to succeed in invoking the 
jurisdictional long-arm than those whose interests are wholly eco-
nomic, and that within these categories the tangibility of the alleged 
harms may be a factor in influencing the judgment. Significant, too, 
is the extent to which the moral values of the forum state are threat-
ened by the alleged conduct of the defendant; this may involve an 
appraisal not merely of the blameworthiness of particular acts, but 
also of the moral responsibility assumed by the defendant through 
a course of conduct.25 As Robert Keeton has taught us,26 the imposi-
tion of liability without fault is not an amoral economic decision; to 
some extent, it may reflect simply a broader moral judgment than 
is usually made. Thus, the supplier of potentially harmful goods 
may be viewed as undertaking a special responsibility for the welfare 
of the consumers which makes it peculiarly inappropriate for him 
to resist the moral claim of the state when it seeks to assert power 
over him. This undertaking is less relevant when the same supplier 
is engaged in a warranty dispute over the quality of delivered goods 
with a commercial buyer who was in a position to bargain for a 
local forum if he regarded the risk of distant litigation as a significant 
aspect of his contract relation; in such a dispute, the supplier is in 
a stronger position to resist the use of the long-arm on the basis of 
attenuated contacts. 
24. Fuller &: Perdue, Reliance Interest in Contract Damages, 46 YALE L.J. 52, 56-57 
(1936). 
25. The Indiana defendant in Keckler v. Brookwood Country Club, 248 F. Supp. 
645 (N.D. Ill. 1965) sought to quash service on one count against it, based on strict 
liability, but not on the other, based on negligence. The court found that the Illinois 
long-arm statute was intended to cover strict liability cases as well as negligence cases 
and that such coverage was constitutional, but it quashed service because of insufficient 
allegations concerning the nature of the defendant's business. 
26. Keeton, Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HAR.v. L. R.Ev. 401 (1959). 
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Also, it seems useful to suggest that claims seeking to impose sanc-
tions which are primarily punitive may be ranked toward the lower 
end of the spectrum, generally requiring greater contact between the 
defendant and the forum that proposes to punish him. Stated another 
way, the fact that a plaintiff has suffered a wrong in his state of resi-
dence, from acts occurring elsewhere, may sometimes be considered 
a "contact" between his state and the defendant alleged to have 
caused the harm. But this same contact is less substantial in an action 
to exact a penalty for improper conduct than in an action to recover 
for injury actually suffered by the plaintiff.27 A state court seeking 
to exercise the power to make a moral judgment about events occur-
ring elsewhere, when that judgment is not apparently supported by 
a need to compensate loss, is in the position of a busybody. The 
defendant who resists its power is in a very strong position to invoke 
the restraint of due process. 
B. The Competition of Interests 
In addition to the hierarchical aspect of the interests that may be 
served by the exercise of power, it is relevant to weigh in the balance 
the apparent costs. If some classes of cases seem to bear a higher 
price than others, this may indicate the wisdom of caution or re-
straint in the exercise of power. It might thus be suggested that 
actions arising from relations which have a recognizable center out-
side the forum state and which may involve persons other than the 
litigants may require a higher measure of contact with the forum 
than those in which such factors are absent. There are, of course, 
many well-defined restraints of this sort, which have served as due 
process limitations on the power of the state courts from the begin-
nings of the fourteenth amendment. Generally, these constitutional 
restraints have been expressed in the form of a requirement of 
jurisdiction over a res which is the object of the relationship. This 
kind of conceptualism has served to supply restrictions on the power 
of state courts to litigate matters concerning the ownership of for-
eign lands and chattels.28 By extension, it has served to restrict 
27. The local quality of such "penal" (yet civil, not criminal) actions has long been 
recognized. E.g., Richardson v. New York Cent. R.R., 98 Mass. 85 (1867); McGrath v. 
Tobin, 81 R.I. 415, 103 A.2d 795 (1954). See generally EHRENZWEIG, supra note 18, at 
134 (1962). At the time of Pennoyer v. Neff it was even possible to argue that a 
judgment fixing liability for violation of the penal statutes of a state would not be 
entitled to full faith and credit elsewhere, though such is no longer the case. Hunting-
ton v. Atrill, 146 U.S. 657 (1892). 
28. Fall v. Eastin, 215 U.S. 1 (1909); Ellenwood v. Marietta Chair Co., 158 U.S. 105 
(1895); Livingston v. Jefferson, F. Cas. No. 8411 (D. Va. 1811). Btit see Reasor-Hill Corp. 
234 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 66:227 
power over foreign family relations.29 With respect to such matters, 
even service of process has been deemed an inadequate basis for the 
exercise of jurisdiction. 
While most constitutional restrictions on jurisdiction can be 
traced to the fourteenth amendment, the commerce clause has also 
been invoked to restrain assertions of state jurisdiction which might 
place an undue burden upon interstate commerce.30 Though the 
commerce doctrine developed before the emergence of a "minimum 
contacts" test, concern with the effects on commerce of too loose a 
standard of jurisdiction has not abated. Citing, by way of example, 
the economic effects of long-arm jurisdiction over such modest entre-
preneurs as the California tire dealer selling to Pennsylvania tourists, 
Judge Sobeloff has warned that "[i]t is difficult to conceive of a more 
serious threat and deterrent to the free flow of commerce between 
the states."31 
Many restraints on state jurisdiction have been self-imposed, so 
that the full development of constitutional doctrine has been ob-
viated. Thus, the historic incapacity of foreign administrators and 
v. Harrison, 220 Ark. 521, 249 S.W.2d 994 (1952); Currie, Full Faith and Credit to For-
eign Land Decrees, 21 U. Cm. L. REV. 620 (1954). 
29. A state court may not dissolve a marriage unless at least one of the partners is 
a resident of the state. This is true even when both parties are, by their casual pres-
ence, subject to service of process within the state. The rationale for this rule is the 
unique interest of the state of domicile in the res of the marriage relation. A divorce 
decree may be attacked collaterally in the courts of a sister state if the attacking party 
can show that neither party was domiciled in the forum state and that one of the 
parties neither argued nor consented to jurisdiction. For the development of the juris-
dictional question in the Supreme Court, see Williams v. North Carolina, 325 U.S. 226 
(1945), Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343 (1948); Johnson v. Muelberger, 340 U.S. 581 
(1951); Vanderbilt v. Vanderbilt, 354 U.S. 416, 421-23 (1957) (history of development 
in the dissent). Similar restrictions exist in cases involving other family relations. 
30. The doctrine was announced in Davis v. Farmers Co-operative Equity Co., 262 
U.S. 312 (1923), and developed in Atchison, T. &: S.F. Ry. v. Wells, 265 U.S. 101 
(1924); St. Louis B. &: M. Ry. v. Taylor, 266 U.S. 200 (1924); Hoffman v. Foraker, 274 
U.S. 21 (1927); Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Mix, 278 U.S. 492 (1929); Denver&: Rio Grande 
R.R. v. Terte, 284 U.S. 284 (1932); International Milling Co. v. Columbia Transp. Co., 
292 U.S. 511 (1934). From 1923 until 1951, the number of cases considering the Davis 
principle averaged about 3.2 per year. Since 1951, the average has been just under 1.2 
per year. During both periods the principle was applied in approximately one-third 
of the cases in which it was considered. For some recent cases applying the principle, 
see White v. Southern Pac. Co., 386 S.W.2d 6 (Mo. Sup. Ct. 1965); Glaser v. Pennsylvania 
R.R., 82 N.J. Super. 16, 196 A.2d 539 (Super, Ct. 1963); Ceravit Corp. AG v. Black 
Diamond S.S. Corp., 44 Misc. 2d 484,254 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. City N.Y. 1964). 
31. Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956). At least 
two other courts have expressed recent concern about the effects of overly liberal 
long-arm rules on commerce. See Fourth N.W. Nat'l Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 
Minn. 110, 117, 117 N.W.2d 732, 736 (1961); Conn v. Whitmore, 9 Utah 2d 250, 255, 
324 P .2d 871, 874 (1959). 
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trustees82 is partly explained by a reluctance to intervene in the 
administration of foreign trusts and estates. While this incapacity 
has been partly overcome,33 so that a more sophisticated reaction to 
cases involving foreign trusts and estates has become possible, there 
is still an evident reluctance to exercise state power in a manner 
that would be disruptive of such relationships.34 It seems quite likely 
that this reluctance has some basis in a due process restraint; indeed, 
the existence of such a restraint is a possible explanation for the de-
cision in Hanson v. Denckla.35 Likewise, the widely recognized "in-
ternal affairs" doctrine, which is applied to corporate shareholder 
litigation,36 probably contains a core of constitutional force. "Mini-
mum contacts" and "fair play" have not developed in their applica-
tion to these classes of cases, for the reason that state practice has 
generally been well within the constitutional limits. 
Properly included, also, as a means of self-restraint which may 
disguise a constitutional requirement in some of its applications, 
is the doctrine pertaining to indispensable parties.37 Again, this is 
a means of recognizing the importance of foreign relationships which 
ought not be disrupted by the application of the local judicial power 
over parties who may be disabled from meeting obligations to others 
not subject to the court's power, or who may be subjected to over-
lapping and conflicting claims or obligations. There seems to be 
little question that some parties are constitutionally indispensable 
because of the unreasonable disruption of their affairs likely to result 
from the proceeding placed under restraint.38 
This brief catalogue of exceptions to the general presumption 
!l2. See discussion and cases cited in EHRENZWEIG, supra note 18, at 44-48, 60-64 
(1962). 
33. Id. at 48-54, 64. 
34. Witness especially the exceptions to the capacity-giving statutes discussed in id. 
at 62-6!!. 
!l5. 357 U.S. 235 (1958). The Court's own rationale was obscure. Cf. Hazard, supra 
note 18, at 244 (describing the Hanson decision as "fair" but obtained "by an analysis 
that in all charity and after mature reflection is impossible to follow"). 
36. The courts are reluctant to entertain suits dealing with the internal affairs of 
foreign corporations even when, by ordinary standards, "contacts" are sufficient to 
support a suit. The question is generally treated as discretionary. Williams v. Green 
Bay&: W.R.R., 326 U.S. 549 (1946); Dudley v. Jack Waite Mining Co., 49 Wash. 2d 
867, 307 P.2d 281 (1957). The rule is not discretionary in Pennsylvania, though the state 
supreme court still claims that the state courts have the power to try such cases. Plum 
v. Tampax, 399 Pa. 553, 160 A.2d 549 (1960). See EHRENZWEIG, supra note 18, at 
135-36 (1962). 
37. Shields v. Barrow, 58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854); FED. R. CIV. P. 19; see Fink, 
Indispensable Parties and the Proposed Amendment to Federal Rule 19, 74 YALE L.J. 
403, 419-21 (1965). 
38. Cf. Western Union Tel. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 368 U.S. 71 (1961) (discussed in text 
accompanying note 49 infra). 
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favoring the constitutionality of the exercise of state power when-
ever "minimum contacts" can be found is probably not exhaustive. 
But it seems sufficient to serve as the basis for the suggestion that the 
due process appraisal embodies an analysis not only of the interests 
served, but also of those disserved, by the proposed exercise of power. 
Undoubtedly, some of the exceptions listed do not in practice 
take the form of litmus paper tests which invoke total restraints 
on the state power or none at all. It seems likely, in fact, that many 
may involve shaded applications: the greater the "contacts," the 
smaller the inhibition. Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure is now quite explicit in requiring the exercise of this kind 
of balanced discretion in the application of the indispensable parties 
doctrine,39 and it is difficult to imagine that the constitutional doc-
trine contained within it could take on a very different contour. 
Indeed, it may be that these interests favoring restraint are often 
inescapably compelling to the court making the due process decision. 
Others have pointed out in a different context that a judicial judg-
ment as to the presence or absence of substantive policies necessi-
tates a relative evaluation.40 To put the matter figuratively, the 
closing of one eye does not often significantly alter the range of 
vision.41 So visible are the needs for restraint that they will impel a 
39. Rule 19 provides that: [T]he court shall determine whether in equity and good 
conscience the action should proceed among the parties before it, or should be dis-
missed •..• The factors to be considered by the court include: first, to what extent 
a judgment rendered in the person's absence might be prejudicial to him to those 
already parties; second, the extent to which, by protective provisions in the judg-
ment, by the shaping of relief, or other measures, the prejudice can be lessened or 
avoided; third, whether a judgment rendered in the person's absence will be ade-
quate; fourth, whether the plaintiff will have an adequate remedy if the action is 
dismissed for nonjoinder. 
Balancing and discretion are clearly directed by these words. See FED. R. CIV. P. 19 
(Advisory Committee's Note on 1966 amendment). See generally Fink, supra note 37, 
at 403; Hazard, Indispensable Party: The Historical Origin of a Procedural Phantom, 
61 CoLuM. L. R.Ev. 1254 (1961); Reed, Compulsory ]oinder of Parties in Civil Actions, 
55 MICH. L. R.Ev. 327 (1957). 
40. E.g., Currie, The Disinterested Third State, 28 LAW &: CoNTElllP. PROB. 754, 
757 (1963): 
[T]he mere fact that a suggested broad conception of a local interest will create 
conflict with that of a foreign state is a .sound reason why the conception should be 
re-examined, with a view to a more moderate and restrained interpretation both 
of the policy and of the circumstances in which it must be applied to effectuate 
the forum's legitimate purpose. 
41. The concept of a unilateral weighing of interests also seems to appear in the 
recent decision of the Third Circuit in Provident Tradesmens Bank &: Trust Co. v, 
Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 365 F.2d 802 (3rd Cir. 1966), cert. granted, 386 U.S. 940 
(1967). The court held that it was inappropriate to consider the interests of the 
plaintiff in making a deterniination as to whether an absent party is indispensable; 
to the extent that the new Rule 19 requires a relative balancing of interest, it was 
deemed invalid as beyond the authorization conferred by the Rules Enabling Act, 28 
U.S.C. § 2072 (1964). The decision rests on a misunderstanding of Shields v. Barrow, 
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response, whether or not the court is conscious or articulate in evalu-
ating the competition between interests. 
Even if it might be possible in some instances to ignore com-
peting values, it would hardly be wise to do so if healthy federal 
relations are to be preserved. It is often true that the countervailing 
policies which favor restraint will have no political outlet in the 
forum state. The interests are embodied in the litigating apparel of 
nonresident defendants, who are unlikely to have any leverage in 
the law-making processes of the state. The favorable presumption 
with which state law is ordinarily viewed when challenged under 
the due process clause is based in part on an assumption that the 
state law reflects a balanced political evaluation; with respect to 
laws pertaining to jurisdiction over non-residents, such an assump-
tion is unfounded.42 Long-arm legislation applies only to those who 
are not constituents, and usually favors those who are. I£ the kinds 
of considerations which have served to support the historic restraints 
pertaining to foreign property, foreign relationships and statutes, 
and to indispensable parties are to be maintained, it must be through 
the exercise of a balanced judgment in which proper weight is 
assigned to competing values which would be served by the restraint 
of state judicial power. 
Thus, it may be concluded that the test required by the due 
process limitation on the power of state courts involves the appraisal 
of interests disfavoring, as well as of interests favoring, the exercise 
of state power. The Supreme Court of Illinois has recently put the 
matter thus: 
[P]rocedural rules must be designed and appraised in light of what 
is fair and just to both sides in the dispute. Interpretations of basic 
rights which consider only those of a claimant are not consonant with 
fundamental requisites of due process.43 
We are unlikely to develop a knowing instinct about the limits of 
state judicial power without an awareness of this. "Minimum con-
tacts" alone is an inadequate doctrinal tool, for in this respect it 
reveals too little about the factors which must influence judgment.44 
58 U.S. (17 How.) 130 (1854), and long-standing practice in the use of the indis-
pensability principle. See Hazard, supra note 39; Reed, supra note 39. For a more 
realistic decision by the same court see Kroese v. General Steel Castings Corp., 179 
F.2d 760 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 983 (1950). 
42. See the Rhode Island statute discussed in note 54 infra. 
43. Gray v. American Radiator &: Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 441, 176 
N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961). 
44. The consequences of this inadequacy are perhaps illustrated in the opinions in 
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III. THE VARIABLE MINIMUM IN PRACTICE 
The Supreme Court has never articulated the principle just 
tendered, at least in the form in which it is expressed here. Only 
once in modern times, however, has the Court undertaken to give 
expression to a general principle governing the application of the 
due process clause to the power of state courts;46 the "fair play" 
formulation which emerged from that opinion is hardly inconsistent 
with what has been said here, if, indeed, it is not a limited statement 
of the need for interest analysis.46 Otherwise, the Court has been 
careful to circumscribe its decisions. In McGee v. International Life 
Insurance Co.,41 the Court upheld the power of the California court 
with an explicit reference to the substantive importance of insurance 
regulation. In Hanson v. Denckla, the power of the Florida court 
was denied, for reasons that were narrowly applicable, perhaps only 
to Florida estates.48 In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pennsyl-
vania,49 the power of the Pennsylvania court was circumscribed for 
reasons that were largely peculiar to the circumstances of escheat 
litigation. This was followed, in Texas v. New Jersey,60 by the 
Court's effort to formulate rather specific rules for escheat. In this 
latter case, the Court observed that "the 'contacts' test as applied in 
this field is not really any workable test at all."01 Finally, in United 
States v. First National City Bank,62 the Court upheld the jurisdic-
tion of the United States over foreign subsidiaries of American 
banks, for the purpose of freezing assets to secure the payment of 
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Birdsong, 360 F.2d !!44 (5th Cir. 1966). The majority ruled 
that, despite the publication in Alabama of an alleged libel by the defendant against 
the plaintiff (the former a Pennsylvania corporation, the latter commander of the 
Mississippi Highway Patrol), Alabama had insufficient interest in the case to allow 
it to long-arm the defendant without a violation of due process. The existence of 
minimum contacts, while discussed, was not decided. Judge Rives, specially concurring 
(at 348), found that there were sufficient minimum contacts between Alabama and the 
defendant, but agreed that Alabama interest in the case was insufficient to support 
jurisdiction consonant with due process. 
45. International Shoe Co. v. Washin-gton, 326 U.S. lll0 (1945). 
46. For example, the Court's discussion of those cases in which single torts have 
and have not given rise to jurisdiction distinguishes them not only by the "quality and 
circumstances" of the commission of the tort, but also by their "nature." 326 U.S. at 
318. Von Mehren and Trautman note that the case can be explained as one in which 
jurisdiction is asserted "in order to vindicate substantive-law policies." Von Mehren 
and Trautman, supra note 18, at 1176-77. 
47. 355 U.S. 220 (1957). 
48. See von Mehren and Trautman, supra note 18, at 1174-75. 
49. !!68 U.S. 71 (1961). 
50. !!79 U.S. 674 (1965). 
51. Id. at 679. 
52. 379 U.S. 378 (1965). 
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American taxes by foreign corporations. The Court carefully noted 
that jurisdiction would not be sustained on the basis of the same 
contacts with respect to all the affairs of the branch bank;58 but the 
importance of protecting the national revenue outweighed the con-
tention of the taxpayer, which was based on the thinness of the 
contacts. 
To some extent, the stolid reluctance of the Court to be drawn 
into overgeneralization has been mirrored by others. Some of the 
state legislatures seeking to exploit the new range of judicial power 
opened up by the demise of Pennoyer v. Neff have been wise enough 
to perceive that the long-arm approach was more appropriate to 
some kinds of cases than to others.54 To some extent, state law has 
been interpreted to allow discretion in applying differing standards 
to different classes of cases. 55 This has perhaps been more true in 
deed than in word. For example, one might infer on the basis of 
reported results that somewhat more contact is required to support 
jurisdiction in a commercial warranty case than in a personal injury 
case, 56 but it is a vain search for an explicit statement that this is 
so.111 
To the contrary, there has been some impetus to build the mini-
mum contacts test into a rigid test, good for all occasions. This has 
been associated in some cases, and in some of the secondary litera-
53. Id. at 384. 
54. The Maine statute, ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 14 § 704(B) (1965) restricts long-
arm jurisdiction in tort cases to those involving physical injury to person or property. 
The New York statute, N.Y. C1v. PRAc. I.Aw § 302 (McKinney 1963) specifically 
excludes defamation as a basis for long-arm jurisdiction. Rhode Island has gone as far 
as possible in the other direction, asserting jurisdiction "in every case not contrary to 
the provisions of the constitution or laws of the United States." R.I. GEN. LAws ANN. 
§ 9.5.33 (Supp. 1966). 
55. See Walker v. Savell, 335 F.2d 536 (5th Cir. 1964) (in which the court expressed 
its belief that Mississippi requires more than merely minimum contacts to assert juris-
diction over publishers, the rule being in deference to freedom of the press). In dra-
matic contrast to the selective self-restraint attributed to Mississippi in Walker v. 
Savell is St. Clair v. Richter, 250 F. Supp. 148 (W.D. Va. 1966). There a federal district 
judge ruled that state court jurisdiction extended to the limits of due process unless 
specifically limited by the state legislature. 
56. No attempt has been made at a statistical study. A comparison of Grobark v. 
Addo Mach. Co., 16 Ill. 2d 426, 158 N.E.2d 73 (1959), with Gray v. American Radiator &: 
Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 176 N.E.2d 761 (1961), or of Fourth N.W. Nat'! 
Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. ll0, 117 N.W.2d 732 (1962), with Adamek v. 
Michigan Door Co., 260 Minn. 54, 108 N.W.2d 607 (1961), however, illustrates the 
general principle. 
57. But cf. Fourth N.W. Nat'! Bank v. Hilson Indus., Inc., 264 Minn. ll0, ll4-16, 
117 N.W.2d 732, 734-36 (1961) in which a distinction between suits involving individ-
uals and those involving only corporations is made; and Erlanger Mills v. Cohoes Fibre 
Mills, 239 F.2d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 1956) where Judge Sobeloff expresses reservations 
about long-arm jurisdiction whether invoked to redress personal injuries or breach of 
warranty. 
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ture, with an effort to focus attention exclusively on the activity of 
the defendant with a view to determining whether he had reason 
to foresee the application of power by the forum state. 58 Such in-
quiries have even led to rather specific factual inquiries about the 
character of the defendant's business and its expectations.59 The 
tendency has been in the direction of requiring a trial of the juris-
dictional facts as a preliminary warm-up for the main event. This 
general "refinement" of the minimum contacts test has occurred 
most frequently in the setting of products liability cases. 
Against this background the Fifth Circuit was recently required 
to decide two cases in which the New York Times was defending it-
self against defamation claims arising from its reports on race rela-
tions in the South. One action was brought in Louisiana, 60 the other 
in Alabama. 61 The plaintiffs pointed to the presence of "stringers" 
who reported to the Times on a random basis, to the occasional 
presence of full-time reporters, and to the fact that their local reputa-
tions had suffered. They also pointed to circulation and advertising 
revenues received by the Times_. In the second case it was also em-
phasized that information for the allegedly defamatory article was 
gathered in Alabama by a full-time reporter sent there by the Times. 
These contacts surely exceeded those ordinarily required in prod. 
ucts liability cases; if "minimum contacts" were a phrase of constant 
meaning, jurisdiction should have been sustained in both cases. 
The Fifth Circuit declined, however, to make such wooden applica-
tions of the "minimum contacts" rule. In the second case the court 
observed that "[f]irst amendment considerations surrounding the 
law of libel require a greater showing of contact to satisfy the due 
process clause than is necessary in asserting jurisdiction over other 
types of tortious activity."62 It then held that the contacts between 
Alabama and the New York Times were insufficient to support 
jurisdiction. Perhaps this holding can be questioned, but the pro-
priety of applying a different standard than that applied in products 
liability cases cannot be soundly challenged. A realistic appraisal 
of the issue could not blink several important facts. First, the 
58. E.g., Gray v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary Corp., 22 Ill. 2d 432, 442, 
176 N.E.2d 761, 766 (1961) ("products presumably sold in contemplation of use here'); 
Currie, supra note 14, at 540. 
59. See Unicon Management Corp. v. Koppers Co., 38 F.R.D. 474 (S.D.N.Y. 1965); 
United States v. Montreal Trust Co., 35 F.R.D. 216 (S.D.N.Y. 1964). In the former case, 
jurisdictional facts were ordered resolved by affidavits; in the latter a full and separate 
hearing was ordered to determine such facts. 
60. Buckley v. New York Times Co., 338 F.2d 470 (5th Cir. 1964). 
61. New York Times Co. v. Connor, 365 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1966). 
62. Id. at 572. 
December 1967] Substantive Jurisdictional Interests 241 
plaintiffs were unable to point to any tangible mJury; their 
claims were largely punitive, or retaliatory, in purpose. Second, 
the defamations alleged were closely related to matters of public 
discourse, with respect to which the law of defamation has only 
very marginal application, and with respect to which the choice 
of forum is an extraordinarily critical matter. In short, the rights 
asserted by the plaintiffs were most fragile. Third, the activities 
of the New York Times appear to have a vortex in the New 
York metropolitan area; as a semipublic institution of that com-
munity, the Times embodies the interests of many to whom a south-
ern court and jury are likely to be somewhat indifferent. In 
reciprocal terms, if Alabamians are to judge the motives of New 
York journalists, and New Yorkers are to judge the motives of 
Alabama journalists, there is a real likelihood of repression of speech 
of the kind most highly valued in each community. While the Times 
could take the unlikely step of avoiding future liabilities and regain-
ing most of its freedom by cutting off its marginal southern sub-
scriptions, this consolation is meager: the consequences of the act 
would still be felt strongly, and unfavorably, in the South. When all 
is considered, it was not unreasonable for the federal court to stay 
the state power, adjudging that a reasonable balance of the interests 
required that the plaintiffs present their claims in a forum closer 
to the center of the Times' activities. 
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit advanced its thesis with great 
diffidence. 63 And, most recently, it has taken occasion to distinguish 
the Saturday Evening Post from the New York Times, holding the 
former amenable to suit in Louisiana.64 The court pointed out that 
the Saturday Evening Post was a national publication, and that the 
location of its headquarters in Philadelphia was incidental. Accord-
ingly, Louisiana was as proper a forum as any. That the alleged 
defamation pertained to a charge of gangsterism may also have in-
fluenced the court somewhat. The issue is quite different from the 
issue of seditious libel which made the choice of forum so critical in 
the two Fifth Circuit New York Times cases. 65 One reason for re-
63. "Nevertheless, since Buckley [on which Connor relied] has been subjected to 
criticism, and since these parties are now before this Court for the third time on 
matters involving the same piece of litigation, we deem it proper from the standpoint 
of judicial administration to consider the merits of this case." Id. at 573. 
64. Curtis Publishing Co. v. Golino, 383 F.2d 586 (5th Cir. 1967). 
65. Cf. Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 153 (1967) (Harlan, J.: "In [New York 
Times Co. v. Sullivan] we were adjudicating in an area which lay close to seditious libel, 
and history dictated extreme caution in imposing liability''); Garrison v. Louisiana, 
379 U.S. 64, 72 n.8 (1964) ("We recognize that different interests may be involved where 
purely private libels, totally unrelated to public affairs, are concerned''). 
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straint that had been present in the former cases was therefore 
absent. 
Meanwhile, the Fifth Circuit decision in the first of the Times 
cases had been followed by a federal court in Connecticut,66 which 
dismissed an action brought against the New York Post. This was 
reversed by the Second Circuit, 67 which rightly observed that the 
contacts between Connecticut and the New York Post were very 
substantial. Even by relatively antique standards, the New York Post 
might have been deemed to be "doing business" in Connecticut. 
Judge Medina, concurring in the result, expressed obvious approval 
of the principle announced by the Fifth Circuit, but he did not find 
it applicable to the case before him.68 Judge Friendly, however, was 
less clear in his position. He offered the thought that the first amend-
ment interests might be more appropriately assimilated to the doc-
trine of forum non conveniens than to minimum contacts; the 
former doctrine, he suggested, may perhaps attain "special dimen-
sions and constitutional stature.''69 With respect to this latter innova-
tion, it is difficult to know precisely what Judge Friendly had in 
mind. It is surely true that the same considerations which are ap-
praised for the purpose of the due process decision bear as well on 
the issue raised by a motion to transfer or dismiss because of the 
inconvenience of the forum. But the discretion vested in the trial 
judge70 and the limited appellate review available on rulings which 
deny such transfers or dismissals71 are features which seem incon-
sistent with "constitutional stature." Inasmuch as the outcome would 
seem the same regardless of the doctrinal association made, it would 
seem that Judge Friendly has expressed substantial approval of the 
Fifth Circuit's willingness to distinguish defamation cases from 
products liability cases. 
IV. THE FLEXIBLE MINIMUM IN THE LITERATURE 
As the Fifth Circuit observed in its second Times decision, its 
expressions of a flexible constitutional standard have not been 
66. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 260 F. Supp. 282 (D. Conn. 1966). 
67. Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 373 F.2d 175 (2d Cir. 1967). 
68. Id. at 184-85. 
69. Id. at 183-84. 
70. Cf. Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) ("The doctrine [of forum 
non conveniens] leaves much to tbe discretion of tbe court to which plaintiff 
resorts ••• "). 
71. See Lansverk v. Studebaker-Packard Corp., 54 Wash. 2d 124, 132, 338 P.2d 747, 
751 (1959); W. BARRON &: A. HoLTZOFF, 1 FEDERAL PRACIICE AND PROCEDURE 433-40 
(Wright ed. 1960). 
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warmly received.72 Apparently distressed by the threat to the pat 
formulation of the minimum contacts doctrine that had emerged 
from products liability litigation, a Columbia Law Review Comment 
accused the court of "tampering with due process" in the second 
case.73 Others have joined a chorus of comments chiding the court 
for its offense to the principle of neutral principles.74 The untidy 
mixing of substance and procedure has been deplored as an almost 
unnatural complication. All of this appears to reflect a misconception 
of the decisional process. The Fifth Circuit could hardly have con-
sidered the Times cases without recognizing what was really at stake. 
An attempt to fit the case into the existing rubric could only have 
produced a papering-over of the real considerations influencing the 
decision. Criticism of the kind described is unlikely to serve its in-
tended purpose of promoting more "principled" decision-making; 
it is more likely to have quite the opposite effect. Failute to give 
explicit recognition to the impact of a decision on substantive in-
terests tends to hinder our understanding, to promote the use of 
fiction, and to complicate the task of the advocate seeking to assist 
the court in making direct confrontation with the issues. This may 
result in more confusion and greater intellectual dishonesty than 
can possibly result from the efforts of the court to state candidly the 
respects in which the Times cases differed from others it had de-
cided. The criticism of the Fifth Circuit seems, therefore, to be quite 
misguided. 
Somewhat different reactions may be garnered from an examina-
tion of the scholarly efforts which seek to synthesize the emerging 
law of jurisdiction of state courts. On the whole, these have been 
much less inhospitable to the particularized approach advocated 
here than are the acerbic comments on the New York Times cases. 
The first work to be considered is the intensive study of the develop-
ment of long-arm jurisdiction in Illinois by David Currie.76 Profes-
sor Currie repeatedly advances substantive values as reasons favoring 
72. See note 63 infra. 
73. Comment, Long-Arm Jurisdiction Over Publishers: To Chill a Mocking Word, 
67 COLUM. L. REv. 342, 361 (1967). 
74. E.g., Note, 35 FORDHAM L. REY. 726 (1967); Comment, 52 IOWA L. REV. 1034 
(1967); Comment, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 436 (1967). In Buckley v. New York Post Corp., 
373 F.2d 175, 182 (2d Cir. 1967) Judge Friendly said: 
We cannot but wonder whether the Connor court would have felt the same way if 
the dramatis personae, instead of being "Bull" Connor and a newspaper inter-
nationally known for its high standards, had been an esteemed local educator or 
clergyman and an out-of-state journal with a taste for scandal which had circulated 
395 copies of a libel stating he had corrupted the morals of the young. 
75. See Currie, supra note 58. 
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the exercise of power by Illinois, 76 and he concedes that the long-
arm should not be invoked in the absence of compelling policy 
reasons favoring use.77 There is, however, some imbalance in the 
presentation. Substantive policies disfavoring the exercise of power 
are brushed aside.78 For example, in disapproving of an early defama-
tion case, which may well have applied a variable standard without 
explicit recognition of it, Professor Currie expresses readiness to 
provide the defamation plaintiff with the same access to his state's 
courts as may be provided to the plaintiff alleged to have been per-
sonally harmed by defective goods.79 He does not, however, explicitly 
reject the relevance of all countervailing policies. It would surely be 
very difficult to do so, while mantaining any claim to the balanced 
judgment required by the due process clause. 
It may well be that Professor Currie's work is simply dated in its 
failure to recognize the occasional force of countervailing policy. 
Just a few years ago, at the time of his writing, there was still a 
general obsession with the constitutional perspective established by 
Pennoyer v. N efj. As long as the constitutional presumption favored 
the restraint of state power, our attention was directed to those sub-
stantive values which were prejudiced by excessive restraint. Only 
in very recent years have we achieved a recognition that the pre-
sumption has been reversed. Hence, it is only now that we are chal-
lenged to seek out and identify the interests that are prejudiced by 
excessive use of judicial power. 
A second important work is that of Geoffrey Hazard, so which 
advances the thesis that due process appraisal should require careful 
attention to the relation between the forum and the transaction or 
activity at which the litigation is directed. Professor Hazard wisely 
acknowledges that his formulation of the minimum contacts test is 
not a universal solvent, and may be subjected to "arbitrary particu-
iarization, "8i such as that employed in Texas v. New Jersey and 
United States v. First National City Bank. One may quarrel only 
76. Id. at 539 (discussing Nelson v. Miller, 11 Ill. 2d 378, 143 N.E.2d 673 (1957)), 
540 (discussing nonresident motorist cases), 556-58 (discussing defective tires pur-
chased out of state), 565 (discussing tort and contract cases), 571 (discussing employ-
ment contracts). 
77. Id. at 543-44. 
78. Such policies are sometimes specifically rejected. Id. at 553 [discussing Insull v. 
New York World-Telegram Corp., 273 F.2d 166 (7th Cir. 1959)], 570 [discussing Morgan 
v. Heckle, 171 F. Supp. 482 (E.D. (1959)]. Most often, however, they are simply ignored. 
79. Id. at 553. 
80. See Hazard, supra note 18. 
81. Id. at 283. 
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with Professor Hazard's modifier, "arbitrary." He does not elaborate 
its meaning, but it seems unlikely that he meant to condemn the 
recognition of differences between cases which require that his in-
sights be adapted to differing uses. 82 
Most troubling in its seeming disregard of the need for substan-
tive interest analysis is the work of Arthur van Mehren and Donald 
Trautman.83 In a very skillful and elaborate treatment, they develop 
the concepts of "general" jurisdiction,84 or the power to adjudicate 
any controversy involving the persons whose rights are to be affected, 
and "specific" jurisdiction,85 which is jurisdiction to adjudicate only 
those matters consequentially related to the forum state. The authors 
find little need to consider substantive differences among cases. They 
concede that substantive concerns may explain an occasional exer-
cise of power which was exceptional to the old Pennoyer principle; 
indeed, they suggest this explanation for the seminal case of Inter-
national Shoe.86 They also concede that the "true conflicts" case, in 
which the forum cannot rely on other courts to defer to a controlling 
substantive policy of the forum state, is a special situation calling for 
the exercise of power.87 But their chief concern (in advancing the 
concept of specific jurisdiction) is directed toward the relative geo-
graphical extents of the parties' activities, and in particular to the 
litigational convenience or inconvenience implied by the defendant's 
relevant activities.88 
Von Mehren and Trautman have assuredly performed excellent 
service in identifying the issues of greatest concern to the procedur-
alist. Furthermore, "specific" and "general" jurisdiction are in all 
respects superior to the opaque concepts of "in personam," "in rem," 
and "quasi in rem" jurisdiction which they would displace. The 
vocabulary is more precise and the theory more useful. Nevertheless, 
such an approach may suffer from a failure to illuminate the role 
of substantive policy considerations. One trained in the method of 
van Mehren and Trautman might well encounter serious difficulty 
in coming to grips with the real issues in cases like the defamation 
cases confronted by the Fifth Circuit. On the basis of litigational 
82. Indeed, Professor Hazard indicates that the participation or "arbitrary categorial 
subsystem" need not remain arbitrary but "can be criticized and corrected intelligently.'' 
Id. at 283 n.149. 
83. Von Mehren &: Trautman, supra note 18. 
84. Id. at 1136. 
85. Id. at 1145. 
86. Id. at 1177. 
87. Id. at 1176-77. 
88. Id. at 1167-69. 
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convenience, or the relative breadth of the parties' activities, the 
balance surely seems to favor the exercise of power. Are the authors 
really bound to that result regardless of the extent to which it might 
chill the free exchange of ideas and information? One seeks in vain 
for a doctrinal basis upon which to distinguish seditious libel cases 
from personal injury products liability cases. 
v. FLEXIBILITY AND COMPLEXITY 
The most substantial reason that can be assigned for reluctance 
to recognize the need for making substantive distinctions is the 
fear that the jurisdictional issue may become so intolerably complex 
that our judicial operations will become overburdened, or top-heavy, 
with preliminary issues. This is a legitimate concern, especially in 
the light of recent developments in the use of the minimum contacts 
test, for it is already bidding to become unworkable. "Single-act" 
long-arm statutes,89 for example, reveal the possibility of a merger 
between the jurisdictional issue and the merits, rendering it impos-
sible to decide the issue of the proper forum without deciding the 
outcome of the dispute. The more thoroughly we press the analysis 
of contacts between the individual defendant and his transaction 
with the forum state, the more cumbersome the decision becomes. 
Many extraneous issues of fact may be raised, pertaining to the pre-
cise nature and extent of the defendant's operations and to his in-
dividual expectations.90 In addition, the von Mehren and Trautman 
approach would seem to indicate a need to support the jurisdictional 
decision with fairly precise knowledge of the nature and extent of the 
evidence that will emerge at trial, for only with such knowledge can 
one make a sensible decision about litigational convenience and 
geographical contacts. 
These developments raise a serious question about the propor-
tion of our judicial resources we wish to invest in a preliminary 
issue that is tangential to the merits. We ought not to forget the 
experience of nineteenth century equity, which seemed to asphyxi-
ate the rights of litigants with prolixity. Edson Sunderland91 and, 
later, Carleton Crick92 have reminded us of this risk in its application 
to overloading the appeal with preliminary jurisdictional issues. Re-
89. E.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110 § 17(l)(b) (Supp. 1966) (providing for jurisdiction by 
reason of "[t]he commission of a tortious act within this State''), 
90. See notes 58 &: 59 supra. 
91. The Problem of Appellate Review, 5 TEXAS L. REv. 126 (1927). 
92. The Final Judgment as a Basis for Appeal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 557-63 (1932). 
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cently, and more relevantly, Robert Kitch has suggested that the 
federal transfer practice is in danger of becoming more trouble than 
it is worth in the coin of interests protected by its use.93 All rights 
must be discounted by the cost of enforcing them; on this basis, 
many interests that might be marginally affected by the jurisdic-
tional decision must be ignored because of the excessive cost of ac-
counting for them. 
But there is no reason to apply such a sweeping discount to all 
substantive values, even if this were possible. We have known since 
the time of the first ruling on a demurrer that it is possible to make 
substantive legal decisions without a sure knowledge of the facts in 
issue. The thesis advocated here is not intended to extend the lines 
of factual inquiry at all. Rather it is intended that sensitive and 
candid use be made of the information which is already available 
before any trial is held. A litigant can be, and is, recognized as a 
member of a class, and the embodiment of its interests, without 
knowing whether he is a winner or a loser. No more than that sort 
of rough assessment is necessary or desirable in order to make a wiser 
preliminary decision on the issue of jurisdiction. 
Indeed, it may even be suggested that a recognition of the dif-
ferences between classes of cases may serve to simplify some juris-
dictional disputes. Consider, for example, the use of long-arm legisla-
tion in products liability disputes. If we could but recognize that 
the use of the long-arm is an addendum to the substantive moral 
judgment we have made about the almost fiduciary obligation of 
manufacturers to make safe goods, we might dispel much of the un-
certainty about the jurisdictional issue. Perhaps we could then recog-
nize the irrelevance of some of the arid statistical analysis which has 
been made to serve in place of thoughtful consideration of the issues. 
We might then treat the small manufacturer of risky goods, much as 
Robert Keeton would treat his insolvent dynamiter,M as one who is 
less entitled to urge restraint in the use of judicial power. Data about 
his gross receipts and profits could be ignored. Similarly, in an 
analogous contract dispute over the quality of goods, the issue might 
in fact be simplified if we could regard the question as a very special 
aspect of contract interpretation. Also, in the seditious libel cases, 
we might spare ourselves the need to appraise a lot of dubious data 
about percentages of advertising receipts, circulation, and reportage, 
9!1. Section U01(a) of the Judicial Code: In the Interest of Justice or Injustice, 40 
IND. L.J. 99 (1965). 
94. Conditional Fault in the Law of Torts, 72 HARV. L. REv. 401, 419 (1959). 
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simply on the basis of a superficial examination of the character of 
the harm and the activity under attack.95 
We must be careful, to be sure, not to expect too much of this 
advantage to emerge from substantive interest analysis. Many hard 
cases will remain so. In the setting of the New York Times cases, for 
example, the question whether the Times is too much a national in-
stitution to urge an immunizing New York center of gravity remains 
a question of possible difficulty. To the extent that the techniques of 
judicial notice are inadequate to supply answers to that sort of ques-
tion, there is danger that some erroneous decisions will be made with 
respect to jurisdictional questions. But that, of course, is nothing 
new, and suggests no reason for refraining from analysis of the sub-
stantive values obviously at stake in such cases. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Surely, on balance, it seems reasonable to suppose that the juris-
dictional decision will be much more clarified than complicated by 
unmasking the fact that the substantive consequences of the decision 
are an appropriate, if not an inevitable, concern. The due process 
requirement, like all other principles of procedure, is the servant 
of substance and must accommodate a variety of conflicting social 
needs. 
95. For example, in Time, Inc. v. Manning, 366 F.2d 690 (5th Cir. 1966); the ques-
tion was one of long-arm jurisdiction in a copyright infringement case. As the court 
noted in upholding jurisdiction: "Here of course, no First Amendment considerations 
make this a special case." Id. at 695. 
